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ENVIRONMENTAL FEES AND
COMPENSATORY TAX IN BRAZIL*
Josg Marcos Domingues*
ABSTRACT
This paper introduces the Brazilian tax system and presents a retro-
spective of Brazil's environmental taxation as well as current Congres-
sional proposals, while focusing on the special case of environmental fees
recently established at the federal, state, and municipal levels. Any polit-
ical entity is entitled to levy fees for its respective specific public services,
including those related to the exercise of police power (monitoring, in-
spection, etc.). After the establishment of the controversial federal
EPA's fee in 2000, which was upheld by the Supreme Court in 2005,
lawmakers have created an increasing number of environmental fees.
Also in 2000, Brazil instituted an environmental compensatory tax called
the Sistema Nacional de Unidades de Conservacao (SNUC) compensa-
tion. As the very first Brazilian environmental tax of its kind, its constitu-
tionality is yet to be tested.
This paper also discusses many controversial issues, such as the tax le-
gality principle in relation to typification and administrative discretion,
concurrent competence vis-A-vis adequacy of taxable events, taxable basis
(including fee-revenue set-off), and retroactive tax enforcement. Finally,
this paper presents the author's views on the perspectives of Brazil's envi-
ronmental taxation as an economic instrument for sustainable develop-
ment and sound environmental public policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
HE underlying inspiration of environmental law is the preserva-
tion of human life on earth through sustainable development. The
right to exist is the basic motivation of Environmental Law. The
world has seen a series of declarations of intent in the last fifty years
ranging from ratification to denials of those proposals. For instance, the
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Stockholm Protocol of 1972 addressed environmental protection,
whereas the Rio de Janeiro ECO-92 Summit debates centered around
environment and development and focused on humankind. And the Ky-
oto Protocol of 1997 proposed reductions of pollutant emissions.
This has been a time for deep ethical reflections on what we are, what
we want for humankind, and what we should do to benefit future genera-
tions. There is a preliminary perspective regarding human rights and the
environment where, according to Argentinean Professor Santiago
Felgueras, environmental degradation may "ultimately hinder the exer-
cise of rights already recognized ... such as the right to live and the right
to health ... even other rights such as cultural rights and the minorities'
rights."1 In fact, what seems to be at stake are nothing less than the most
important values-human life and human life with dignity.
Today the environment raises some fundamental questions connected
to political and economic issues. The first issue relates to human rights
and the environment within the spectrum of north-south relations. The
question involves industrialization and development of a few at the cost
of de-industrialization and underdevelopment of many others, causing an
increasing degradation of the quality of life standards in most parts of the
planet. Yet this is not a new or recent issue. The tension between devel-
opment, exploitation of natural resources, and people (notwithstanding
the human right to a healthy, clean environment) is an old problem that
dates back to the Roman Empire, the Great Navigations, colonialism,
and liberalism. It also relates to tariff and non-tariff trade barriers im-
posed by developed countries in times of neo-liberal globalization. After
all, if natural resources and poverty are found in the same places, one
may reasonably ask whether the resources of the so-called third world are
being developed for the benefit of its people.
The second issue refers to the environmental costs of economic devel-
opment and sustainable development. Today there is a consensus that
non-sustainable development is not development, for it disrupts the envi-
ronment and threatens life.
The third issue addresses environmental awareness. This concerns peo-
ple's awareness, general education, and environmental education in par-
ticular. It calls for governmental awareness and deals with the conflicts of
interests between the governments' economic and environmental agen-
cies, such as related budgetary disputes (e.g., earmarking, non-earmark-
ing of revenues, tax neutrality, and environmental taxation credibility).
Environmental awareness also relates to internal environmental costs,
where businesses' accounting of environmental protection measures is re-
flected in the prices of goods. Finally, environmental awareness raises
questions about the use and the usefulness of economic instruments to
benefit environmental protection and sustainable development.
1. SANTIAGO FELGUERAS, DERECHOS HUMANOS Y MEDIO AMBIENTE 17 (AD-HOC
1996) (translated by the author).
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Of course, one must also pay attention to administrative instruments
for environmental protection. Command-and-control, regulation, licens-
ing, monitoring, auditing, and fining are traditional tools based on police
power. Police power can be described as the power (but also duty) to
regulate individual rights in light of the public interest.
II. ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
Environmental doctrines recognize subsidies, tradable permits, de-
posit-refunds, and environmental taxation as adequate economic instru-
ments to enhance environmental protection.
Subsidies or subsidized funding are direct or indirect government
grants to economic agents engaged in an activity relevant to the public
good and thus deserving of state support.
Tradable permits are market mechanisms that allow environmentally
efficient companies to sell their under-used polluting licenses (trade-off
of permits) to technologically outdated companies.2 A similar device has
been introduced by the Kyoto Protocol that allows companies of desig-
nated countries (listed in Annex 1) to invest in projects aimed at reducing
polluting-emissions in developing countries and to receive (buying-in-ex-
change-for) the respective environmental certificates then used for ac-
counting for the respective environmental efforts/goals in their home
countries.
A deposit-refund is a device whereby a part of the price of dischargea-
ble goods (such as razor blades, batteries, packing material) is repaid to
the consumer. This tool may work both as a legally allowed private over-
price, or as a tax. For example, the tax created by the Belgium law of July
16, 1993, is due on practically all purchases of dischargeable products, but
the tax is not due, or if due it is refundable, for purchases of recyclable
items, thus operating as a tax incentive.
Environmental taxes are fiscal tools derived from state power to collect
financial compulsory contributions from those who fall under its author-
ity aiming at funding state actions. These taxes have either a broad or
narrow meaning, depending on whether they are charged on direct use of
the environment or on ordinary situations only indirectly connected to
the former.
Economic instruments are fundamentally based on a general principle
2. EDWARD KORMONDY, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF POLLUTION CONTROL
(Greenwood Press 1989); STEPHEN SMIT- & HANS B. VOS, EVALUER LES INSTRU-
MENTS ,CONOMIQUES DES POLITIQUES DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development 1997). Trade-offs are still an incipient
tool in many countries. The Kyoto Protocol stimulates their use, but Japan, for
instance, has recently postponed decision on on-going studies for implementation
thereof. Mick Corliss, Emissions-Trading Plan Put on Back Burner, THE JAPAN
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at 3. "[T]rading regimes are going online around the world.
And some commentators worry that Japan is falling behind the curve." Id.
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of environmental law, known as the polluter-pays principle. 3 This princi-
ple has a positive meaning (polluter imputation of the costs of environ-
mental public services) and a selective meaning (modulating or adjusting
said cost imputation according to the intensity of pollution). 4
III. THE BRAZILIAN TAX SYSTEM
The Federative Republic of Brazil is a federation, instituted in 1889,
and it succeeded the Empire of Brazil, as the country had been known
since its independence from the Kingdom of Portugal in 1822.
Today, the Brazilian tax system is basically provided for in title VI,
chapter I, articles 145 through 156 of the Federal Constitution of October
5, 1988, as amended. 5 It distributes the taxing power directly to the fed-
eral, state, and municipal governments because they6 ought to be politi-
cally and financially autonomous.7 Thus in Brazil, there is no delegation
of taxing power to local governments, but a direct constitutional grant of
local taxing power.
Also, the Brazilian Constitution, following the American tradition, ex-
pressly indicates incumbencies to be exercised by the federal government,
reserving residual powers to be exercised by states. 8 The Constitution
also refers to those parochial interests governed by municipal
authorities. 9
The Brazilian tax system consists of three basic types of tributes:10 im-
3. "I1 (le principe pollueur-payeur) est inspir6 par la thdorie 6conomique selon la-
quelle les cofts sociaux externes qui accompagnent la production industrielle
(dont le coot r6sultant de la pollution) doivent tre internalisds c'est-A-dire pris en
compte par les agents 6conomiques dans leurs cooits de production." MICHEL
PRIEUR, DROIT DE L'ENVIRONMENT 123 (Dalloz 1991). Note that the greater the
cost share borne by the polluter, the greater the adherence to the polluter-pays
principle. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
THE POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE: DEFINITION, ANALYSIS, IMPLEMENTATION 6
(1975).
4. JOSE MARCOS DOMINGUES, DIREITO TRIBUTARIO E MEIo AMBIENTE: PROPOR-
CIONALIDADE, TIPICIDADE ABERTA, AFETACAO DA RECEITA 17-27 (Renovar 2d
ed. 1999).
5. CONSTITUICAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [Constitution] arts. 145-46 (Braz.).
6. Due to a Portuguese tradition of recognizing a strong voice in city councils, Brazil-
ian municipalities have become a party to the Federation beside member states
and the federal district. Id. at art. 1.
7. Id. at art. 25 (states' powers); id. at art. 30 (municipalities' powers).
8. Id. at art. 25 1.
9. Id. at art. 30.
10. Tributo is the general word used in Portuguese in the same sense as abgabe is used
in German. The National Tax Code specifies that the taxable event of an imposto
(impost) is a situation not connected to any state action referred to the taxpayer,
and that the taxable event of a taxa (fee) is the exercise of administrative police
power or the actual or potential use of specific public service rendered to the tax-
payer or put at the disposal of the same. CODIGO TRIBUTARIO NACIONAL
[C.T.N.] arts. 16 & 77 (Braz.), available at https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/eis/
L5172Compilado.htm. Finally, the taxable event of a betterment assessment is the
appreciation of real estate property value due to public works in its vicinage. Id. at
arts. 16 & 81.
2007] ENVIRONMENTAL FEES AND COMPENSATORY TAX 283
postos," which are imposts on general expressions of wealth; taxas,12
which are fees levied by virtue of police power or for the actual or poten-
tial use of specific and divisible public services rendered to taxpayers or
made available to them; and contribui des de melhoria,13 which are bet-
terment assessments levied on the appreciation of private real estate
property due to public works.
Since the eighteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution of 1946,
dated December 1, 1965,14 Brazilian tributes have been statutorily classi-
fied in the foregoing three basic categories according to their respective
fatos geradores or taxable events (or steuertatbestand).
Besides, in article 148, the Brazilian Constitution also provides that the
federal union may institute empr~stimos compuls6rios,15 which are com-
pulsory loans to defray extraordinary expenses resulting from public ca-
lamities, foreign war or imminence thereof, and in the event of a public
investment that is urgent and of relevant national interest. The federal
union may also institute contribuigdes parafiscais16  (parafiscal
contributions). 17
Regarding federal taxes (imposts), article 153 provides for the exclu-
sive federal competence to impose taxes (impostos) on: imports of foreign
products; exports to other countries of national or nationalized products;
income and earnings of any nature; industrialized products; transactions
of credit, foreign exchange and insurance or transactions with instru-
ments and securities; rural land; and large assets. 18
Also, article 154 provides for the exclusive federal competence to es-
tablish extraordinary war taxes upon the imminence of foreign war,
whether or not such competence is included in its ordinary taxing power.
11. Impostos as "[tiaxes, duties, or impositions levied for divers reasons" is the specific
Portuguese word for the German word steuer. Cf BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 756
(6th ed. 1990).
12. Taxa, which corresponds to the German gebiihre, may not have assessment basis
reserved for impostos. C.F. at art. 145 T 2.
13. Contribui~do de melhoria roughly corresponds to the German erschliessungsbei-
trdg; but its amount may not exceed the amount of the appreciation of private
property derived from relevant public works concerned.
14. Before this date, Decree-Law number 2.416, of July 17, 1940, had defined imposto
or impost as "the tribute the purpose of which is to attend general needs of the
Public Administration", and taxa or fee as "the tribute collected in payment for
specific public services rendered to the taxpayer or made available thereto, or the
contribution the purpose of which is to fund special (public) actions arising from
the public interest or from given groups of individuals." Decreto No. 2.416, de 17
de julho de 1940 (Braz.) (translated by the author). Doctrinal criticism on the
above legislation may be seen in Rubens Gomes de Sousa, Compendio de Legisla-
Cdo Tributdria, RESENHA TRIBUTARIA, 1975, at 163-69 (Sao Paulo, Braz.) (ediqdo
p6stuma).
15. Empr~stimo compuls6rio is the Portuguese equivalent to the French emprunts
forces, or the German zwangsanleihe.
16. Contribuigdo parafiscal is the Portuguese equivalent to the French contribution
parafiscal and the German parafiskalischebeitrg.
17. Local governments have a minor competence to establish local contributions. C.F.
at art. 149.
18. Id. at art. 153.
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The federal union may also establish taxes not listed in article 153, pro-
vided they are non-cumulative and have a specific taxable event or tax
basis other than those falling within the respective exclusive taxing com-
petences of the states, the federal district, or the municipalities. 19
Article 155 provides for the exclusive competence of the states and of
the federal district to impose taxes (impostos) on: inheritance and gifts;
transactions relating to the circulation of goods, the rendering of inter-
state and inter-municipal transportation services, and communication ser-
vices; and ownership of automotive vehicles. 20
Finally, article 156 provides for the exclusive competence of municipal-
ities to impose taxes (impostos) on: urban real estate; the transfer of real
estate property rights on any account and for consideration; and the ren-
dering of services other than those mentioned in article 155 (which are
taxed by the states and the federal district). 21
The Brazilian National Tax Code provides for the distinction among
tributes, such as imposts and fees. The distinction may be found directly
or indirectly in other countries' tax codes, such as the German abgabe-
nordnung, the Spanish ley general tributaria, and the legislation of major
Latin American countries following the Model Tax Code for Latin
America.22
Another primary function of the National Tax Code is to make clear
the basic principles of the tax system, such as the meaning of tax legality,
tax equality, tax immunity, tax-exemption criteria, and standards for solv-
ing conflicts of taxing power among the three levels of government.
Pursuant to the provision of article 146 of the Brazilian Constitution,
the National Tax Code shall (I) provide for the resolution of conflicts of
taxing power among the federal union, the states, the federal district, and
the municipalities; (II) "regulate the constitutional limitations on the
power to tax;" and (III) establish tax law general standards, particularly
regarding (a) "the definition of tributes and their types," and, in regard to
those imposts specified in the "Constitution, the definition of the respec-
tive taxable events, assessment bases and taxpayers" thereof; (b) tax obli-
gation, assessment, credit, statute of limitations, and laches; and (c)
"adequate tax treatment for" cooperatives. 23
In fact, the National Tax Code has provided for the following matters:
definitions of tributes and their types; taxing power and administrative
tax enforcement; limits of the taxing power, including tax immunities;
compulsory loans and war taxes; characteristics (taxable events and tax
bases) of tributes; tax law general standards, covering matters such as the
meaning of tax legislation (including tax treaties and their efficacy), char-
19. Id. at art. 154.
20. Id. at art. 155.
21. Id. at art. 156.
22. The Model Tax Code for Latin America was drafted in the 1960s under the aus-
pices of the Inter-American Development Bank and the American States
Organization.
23. C.F. at art. 146.
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acteristics of the tax legality principle,2 4 limits of administrative regula-
tion, guidance and interpretation of tax law, tax obligation, taxable
events, taxpayers and creditors of a tax obligation, tax liability of taxpay-
ers and of third parties, tax assessment, payment and refund of taxes,
statute of limitation and laches, tax exemption, tax moratorium and tax
amnesty, guarantees and privileges of tax rights, and tax administration.
The National Tax Code has been crucial to Brazil as to other Latin
American countries built upon heterogeneous cultural and political
backgrounds.
In short, according to the Brazilian tax system, imposts are levied on
wealth in the forms of capital, income, and consumption. Fees are basi-
cally due in relation to the rendering of compulsory specific public ser-
vices, such as licensing, inspections, and court procedures. Betterment
assessments are levied on the basis of real estate value appreciation due
to public works in the respective vicinage.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND THE BRAZILIAN
TAX SYSTEM
Environmental taxation is a category that has been in the forefront of
economic and legal research for the past thirty years. Yet there is still a
hard discussion going on as to its scientific soundness. But even when it is
theoretically accepted, there is little consensus as to how it should be put
into operation.
Green taxes are technically designated environmental taxes. The label
of green tax refers to taxes that have environmental-friendly motivation.
These taxes may be understood as having both a broad and a narrow
meaning.
The broad meaning of an environmental tax is that of an ordinary or
traditional tribute adapted so as to benefit environmental protection ef-
forts. The narrow or strict meaning is that of a new, separate tribute
charged on the use of the environment by economic actors.
Making environmental taxes work is the issue. Professor Herrera
24. The following may only be set forth by law:
I - imposition of tributes, or abolishment thereof;
II - increase of tributes or reduction thereof ... ;
III - definition of taxable events of main tax obligations.., as well as the
definition of the relevant debtor;
IV - establishment of the tax rate and its assessment basis . .
V - imposition of penalties for actions or omissions contrary to law provi-
sions or other violations defined therein;
VI - cases in which the tax credit may be excluded, suspended and extin-
guished, cases for dismissal or reduction of the penalties.
§ 10 Any change in the tax assessment basis to the effect of increasing its
amount is held equivalent to the increase of the tax.
§ 20 For the purposes of the provisions of item II of this article, the mon-
etary adjustment of the value of relevant assessment basis does not con-
stitute increase of the tax.
C.T.N. at art. 97 (translated by the author).
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Molina 25 advised that environmental regulation, like environmental taxa-
tion, is of a transversal or polycentric character (and interdisciplinary)
because it deals with multiple and conflicting interests.
Taxes were originally conceived as an instrument to transfer private
resources to the treasury to cope with public expenditures. When taxes
serve this function, they are referred to as fiscal or financial (finanzsteuer)
taxation (hence, fiscal revenues), which correspond to a non-regulatory
state policy. In other words, they relate to neutral public finances, which
were glorified by the laisser faire, laisser passer.
But taxes may exercise a great influence over economic activity, for
they are one of the main costs of businesses. Taxes may be used as an
indirect regulatory (ordnungsteuer) economic instrument. For example,
an activity or product that is highly taxed may be discontinued in favor of
activities subject to lower taxes rates. Maybe the oldest example of this
kind of tax is the tariff barrier to protect the domestic industry. The old
Gauls used tariff barriers against the Romans, mercantilism made wide-
spread use of them, and even nowadays they are used, along with non-
tariff barriers, to hamper free competition in closed markets.
In this latter sense, taxes are referred to as non-fiscal or extra-fiscal 26
taxation because they do not aim at raising funds for public expenditure
(some would aim at no tax collection at all as the true tariff barrier).
Instead, the goal of non-fiscal taxation is to direct the economy and focus
on political goals. Non-fiscal taxes are also regulatory taxes, taxes
d'orientation, or Marktordnungsabgaben,27 because, in the words of Pro-
fessor Xavier Oberson, as zwecksteuern they are "money having the goal
of affecting taxpayers' attitudes. '28
Environmental taxes may have both a fiscal function (which corre-
sponds to the positive meaning of the polluter-pays principle) and an ex-
tra-fiscal function (which corresponds to the selective meaning of the
principle), even though they are basically of a regulatory nature. Their
main goal is to change the taxpayers' (businesses and consumers) behav-
iors; in other words, they mostly aim at producing or enhancing environ-
mental awareness.
Of course fees and betterment assessments have basically a fiscal func-
tion, but imposts (taxes on capital, income, and consumption) are those
most effective not only for fund raising but also for economic regulation,
because imposts may be levied on every stage of the economic chain.
25. PEDRO MANUEL HERRERA MOLINA & CARLOS PALAO TABOADA, DERECHO
TRIBUTARIO AMBIENTAL: LA INTRODUCCION DEL INTERES AMBIENTAL EN EL
ORDENAMIENTO TRIBUTARIO 185 (2000).
26. HEINRICH WILHELM KRUSE, DERECHO TRIBUTARIO: PARTE GENERAL 68-69 (Per-
fecto Yebra Martul-Ortega & Miguel Izquierdo Macias-Picavea. trans., Derecho
Reunidas ed., 1978).
27. XAVIER OBERSON, LES TAXES D'UORIENTATION: NATURE JURIDIQUE ET CONSTI-
TUTIONNALITPr 23 (Ba^le: Helbing & Lichtenhahn 1991).
28. Id. at 23-24 (translated by the author).
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Brazilian federal imposts have been traditionally used for the purpose
of creating a green tax system through broad-sense environmental taxes.
Industrialized-products tax (IPI) rates2 9 charged on certain gasoline-run
vehicles have varied between 25 and 30 percent, whereas alcohol-run ve-
hicles are charged at between 20 and 25 percent. Also, the federal tax on
rural land is not charged on private forestall reserves. 30 And the Agricul-
tural National Policy Act3' establishes the protection of the environment,
the incentive to its rational use, and environmental reclamation as some
of its goals, listing among the respective governmental instruments taxa-
tion and fiscal incentives. Federal laws have created tax incentives for
forestation and reforestation, 32 and for recycling. 33 In the first case, of
forestation and reforestation, the law grants deductibility up to 50 percent
of the income tax due of the amount invested by the taxpayer.34 As to
the latter case, in 2002 the law granted an d-forfait IPI tax credit in con-
sideration of purchases of tax-free plastic rejects due for recycling.35
States have also experienced the green influence on their taxes. Inter-
state Agreement number 101 of December 12, 1997 (in force until April
30, 2007) granted state sales-tax exemption for nationwide sales of equip-
ment for solar and eolian energy conversion.36
Rio de Janeiro state grants a one-third sales-tax reduction for domestic
sales of equipment for construction, relocation, or modernization of in-
dustrial or agro-industrial plants that aim at environmental protection. 37
Also, automobile tax38 rates on natural gas or electric-energy-run vehicles
(1 percent) or on alcohol-run vehicles (2 percent) are substantially lower
than those charged on gasoline-run ones (4 percent).
Sao Paulo state's automobile-tax 39 rates also vary according to fuel us-
age: 3 percent (against 4 percent standard rate) in the case of alcohol,
natural gas, or electricity; and 6 percent for cars run on diesel oil.
Rio de Janeiro city exempts lots and buildings that are relevant for
landscape or environmental preservation from urban property tax.40 Ex-
29. Decreto No. 755, de 19 de fevereiro de 1993, D.O.U. de 20.2.1993 (Braz.).
30. Lei No. 9.393, de 19 de dezembro de 1996, D.O.U. de 20.12.1996 (Braz.).
31. Lei No. 8.171, de 17 de janeiro de 1991, D.O.U. de 18.1.1991 (Braz.), amended by
Lei No. 9.712, de 20 de novembro de 1998, D.O.U. de 23.11.1998 (Braz.).
32. Lei No. 5.106, de 2 de setembro de 1966, D.O.U. de 5.9.1966 (Braz.).
33. Medida Provis6ria No. 75, de 24 de outubro de 2002 (not converted into a statute).
34. Lei No. 5.106.
35. Medida Provis6ria No. 75.
36. Convenio ICMS No. 101, de 12 de dezembro de 1997, D.O.U. de 18.12.1997
(Braz.).
37. Lei No. 2.055, de 25 de janeiro de 1993, (12% of selling price, against 18% in the
case of ordinary sales). In this respect, see DOMINGUES, supra note 4, at 51.
38. Lei No. 948, de 26 de dezembro de 1985, D.O.E. de 27.12.1985 (Braz.), amended
by Lei No. 3.355, de 29 de dezembro de 1999, D.O.E. de 30.12.1999 (Braz.).
39. Lei No. 6.606, de 20 de dezembro de 1989, D.O.E.S.P. de 21.12.1989 (Braz.),
amended by Lei No. 7.644, de 23 de dezembro de 1991, D.O.E. de 24.12.1991
(Braz.) & Lei No. 9.459, de 16 de dezembro de 1996, D.O.E. de 17.12.1996 (Braz.).
40. Lei No. 691, de 24 de dezembro de 1984, C6digo Tributgrio Municipal, DORJ IV -
SUPLEMENTO 1984/12/26 (Braz.).
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amples of exempt land include designated forestall reserves and any lots
bigger than 1 hectare effectively covered by forests.
Several legislative initiatives have been taken in the national Congress
aiming at introducing other broad environmental tax measures. Some ex-
amples include: PL 6262/05, of the House of Representatives-IPI ex-
emption for environmental-quality certified products; PL 3637/04, of the
House-income tax reduction in proportion to the usage of recycled
materials; PL 3955/04, of the House-deduction in double (as operational
expenses or costs) of the amount invested in purchasing and installing
equipment for pollution reduction (limited to 15 percent of taxable
profit); PL 3955/04, of the House-IPI exemption for non-polluting
equipment, machinery, and apparatus coupled with the saving of the tax
credit on the respective inputs; PL 5501/01, of the House-50 percent
reduction of IPI on recyclable packing; PL 1760/99, of the House-IPI
exemption for products the manufacturing cost of which is formed with
more than 50 percent in recycled raw materials; and PLs 5162/05 and
5974/05, of the Senate-special deduction (up to 40 percent) of amounts
donated to non-profit entities in connection to projects intended to pro-
mote the sustainable use of natural resources and environmental preser-
vation, limited to 4 percent of income tax due.4 1
Despite these representative efforts towards environmental preserva-
tion, the big challenge today is to further advance the establishment of a
new kind of environmental tax (some would say a true environmental
tax) in its narrow or strict sense. So far, Brazil has not established strict-
sense environmental taxes on pollution (emissions, rejects, and effluents).
The one attempt that has been made is under scrutiny for its constitution-
ality before the Federal Supreme Court.
V. FEES, TAX SYSTEM, AND ENVIRONMENTAL FEES
IN BRAZIL
The Brazilian tax system reflects the special characteristic of the Brazil-
ian Federation, consisting of the association of the member states, the
municipalities, and the federal district (the Union's Capitol). 42 All three
political entities have the institutional power from the Federal Constitu-
tion to establish their own taxes, including fees for public services.
According to the Constitution 43 and the Tax Code,44 fees may be
charged for the exercise of police power and where a specific and divisi-
ble public service is rendered or put at the disposal of the individual tax-
payer. According to legal doctrine, the amount of such police fees and
service fees must keep a reasonable equivalence with the respective taxa-
ble events, the taxable basis of which must be the former's economic ex-
41. PL stands for Projeto de Lei (a proposed bill).
42. C.F. at art. 1.
43. Id. at art. 145 § II.
44. C.T.N. at art. 77.
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pression. 45 So the proportionality principle must govern the statutory
legal criteria provided for the fee assessment.
In the case of environmental fees, there must be a connection between
the activity of the economic agent (the taxpayer) and the amount of the
corresponding public service (the taxable event).4 6
Police fees are mostly due in regard to audits, inspections, and licenses
intended to verify or control whether entrepreneurial activities meet pol-
lution and other environmental administrative standards. License fees
have been designated tolerance fees 47 because they are related to the ex-
ercise of administrative control as to the level of pollution tolerated by
society.
VI. FEES IN BRAZILIAN LAW
The Brazilian Tax Code defines the taxable event of fees as those
charged by the union, the states, the federal district, and the municipali-
ties that must fall "within the respective incumbencies. '48 This is because
the Brazilian tax system 49 corresponds to a constitutional division of ad-
ministrative competences among the union, the states, the federal district,
and the municipalities.5 0
Thus the tax competence as to fees is held in common by the political
entities, provided they perform their taxable event (public service) within
their respective administrative incumbencies, which in turn function as a
reciprocal limit of the taxing power.
Following the American constitutional tradition, Brazilian federal com-
petences (related to the national interest) are listed 51 in articles 21 and 22
of the Constitution. The municipal competences are limited by the local
interest (article 30 of the Constitution), while remaining residual powers
are reserved to member states, (article 25, section 1, of the Constitution)
without limitation to other designated incumbencies. 52
The "oldest of administrative expressions," the police power has diver-
sified itself and brought the environmental police into scene as its special-
ized branch for the purposes of controlling the use of the environment by
45. AMILCAR FALCAO, FATO GERADOR DA OBRIGACAO TRIBUTARIA 138 (Revista
dos Tribunais ed., 4th ed. 1977).
46. Brazilian Supreme Court case law has upheld the service-cost requirement doc-
trine. See RE-Recurso Extraordintrio No. 102.524, publ. Ditirio da Justiqa of Nov.
8, 1994 (Braz.); Rep.-Representaq~o No. 1.077, publ. DiArio da Justiqa of Sep. 28,
1984 (Braz.).
47. Pedro Manuel Herrera Molina & Domingo Carbajo Vasco, Marco General
Juridico de la Tributaci6n Medioambiental: Concepto, Marco Constitucional y
Marco Comunitario, in TRIBUTACION MEDIOAMBIENTAL: TEORIA, PRACTICA Y
PROPUESTAS 61, 99 (2004).
48. C.T.N. at art. 77 (translated by the author).
49. C.F. at arts. 145 §§ II & III, 153, 155, 156; see also id. at arts. 20, -32.
50. C.T.N. at arts. 21, 22, 25, 30 & 32.
51. Cf. TOSH10 MUKAI, DIRErTo AMBIENTAL SISTEMATIZADO 17 (Forense Univer-
sittria, 2d ed. 1994).
52. C.F. at arts. 25, 30.
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individuals and legal entities. 53 In general, the respective police fees aim
at financing the cost of public services connected thereto. 54 They are
charged in order to reimburse the state for the cost incurred in the activ-
ity that the relevant taxable event is connected to.55
Environmental fees are governed by the above principles that theoreti-
cally justify their institution in Brazil. Thus, a fee must correspond to a
federal, state, or municipal public service rendered by the competent en-
tity. The question becomes the scrutiny of administrative incumbencies
that, exercised in a legitimate manner, may supply good grounds for the
institution of fees.
The classic criterion for such administrative discrimen, especially con-
cerning police power,56 rests in the legislative material competence attrib-
uted to the Constitution. In principle, the political entity entrusted
therewith shall be entitled to render the respective public services and
thus to institute the corresponding fees. Although in principle there
should not be overlaps in administrative competences, 57 this situation
may occur in the presence of a convergence of different federative inter-
ests58 around the same protected asset or good, in which case the exercise
of more than one police power justifies the exaction of the respective
fees. From the tax viewpoint, this situation may lead to double or multi-
ple taxation provided that more than one political entity exercises their
respective shares of police power, which is the taxable event for fees. 59
This is precisely what may happen in the domain of environmental po-
lice power because the Brazilian Constitution 60 provides that it is incum-
bent upon the government (at all three federative levels) to defend and
preserve the environment. The Constitution entrusts all political entities
with concurrent legislative powers regarding environmental matters.61
But these prerogatives are mutually limited by the respective national,
53. DIOGO DE FIGUEIREDO MOREIRA NETO, CURSO DE DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO:
PARTE INTRODUCTORIA, PARTE GERAL E PARTE ESPECIAL 338 (Forense, 7th ed.
1989) (translated by the author).
54. ALIOMAR BALEEIRO, UMA INTRODUCAO A CItNCIA DAS FINAN4;AS 3 (16th ed.
2004) (translated by the author).
55. Luiz EMYGDio FRANCO DA ROSA JONIOR, MANUAL DE DIREITO FINANCEIRO &
DIREITO TRIBUTARIO 250-51 (Renovar, 6th ed. 1995).
56. CELSO ANTONIO BANDEIRA DE MELLO, CURSO DE DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO 575
(Malheiros, 11th ed. 1999).
57. Luis Roberto Barroso, A Protegdo do Meio Ambiente na Constituigdo Brasileira,
44 REVISTA DE DIREITO DA PROCURADORIA-GERAL DO ESTADO DO Rio DE
JANEIRO 41, 57 (1992).
58. For instance, the Tijuca Forest located in Rio de Janeiro City is a national park, a
reserve of the Atlantic Rain Forest, and an object of national interest. The dimen-
sions of this forest influence the climate of Great Rio, the inter-city metropolitan
region (attracting state interest); and it has a unique landscape and tourist value
for the city of Rio de Janeiro (municipal interest), not limited to a strictly environ-
mental interest. C.F. at art. 225 § II.
59. Flivio Bauer Novelli, Apontamentos sobre o Conceito Juridico de Taxa, 45
REVISTA DE DIREITO DA PROCURADORIA-GERAL DO ESTADO DO RIO DE
JANEIRO 93, 100-101 (1992).
60. C.F. at arts. 23, 225.
61. Id. at art. 24 §§ VI-VIII.
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state, or local interests, which ought to be attended to by the union, the
states, and the municipalities. 62 The administrative activity should not
lead to federative conflicts and waste of financial resources.63
The Constitution requires that Congress set down general rules pro-
moting cooperation among the political entities, aimed at the attainment
of balanced development and well-being nationwide. 64 The National En-
vironmental Policy Act (NEPA), Law number 6.938, of 1981, required65
that Congress enact general rules for solving conflicts of taxing compe-
tences among the political entities. This is important regarding fees (and
environmental fees) for the respective public services. The National Tax
Code66 helps taxpayers avoid being taxed by a government that has not
been granted the specific taxing power.
VII. ENVIRONMENTAL FEES OF THE BRAZILIAN
INSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENT AND RENEWABLE
NATURAL RESOURCES (IBAMA) 67
Keeping in mind the federative and subsidiary principles,68 NEPA rec-
ognizes member-states' competence to perform environmental licensing,
which falls within the scope of general police power (the environmental
police power, as already noted).69 But IBAMA is empowered to perform
licensing of businesses having a national or regional (interstate) impact.70
Also, federal subsidiaries are mentioned throughout NEPA, which pro-
vides for federal auditing and control where states and municipalities
have failed to perform their environmental police duties. 71
Originally, NEPA did not create any environmental taxes. It was only
in 2000 that they were established. 72
A. THE FEE OF ARTICLE 17-A
Under article 17-A, "there are hereby established the prices for ser-
vices and products of IBAMA, to be applied nationwide, pursuant to the
62. MANOEL GONMALVES FERREIRA FILHo, DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL ECONOMICO
125 (Saraiva ed., 1990).
63. PAULO Jost LEITE FARIAS, Compet&ncia Federativa e Proteqdo Ambiental 316
(Fabris 1999).
64. C.F. at art. 23 sole paragraph.
65. Id. at art. 146 § I. Lei No. 6.938, de 31 de agosto de 1981, D.O.U. de 2.9.1981
(Braz.) [hereinafter NEPA].
66. See ELCIO FONSECA REIS, FEDERALISMO FISCAL: COMPETENCIA CONCORRENTE E
NORMAS GERAIS DE DIREITO TRIBUTARIO 127 (Belo Horizonte: Mandamentos
2000).
67. IBAMA stands for Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais
RenovAveis, http://www.ibama.gov.br/novo ibama/index.php?.
68. C.F. at art. 25 (stating "All powers that this Constitution does not prohibit the
States from exercising shall be conferred upon them") (translated by the author).
69. NEPA at art. 10.
70. Id. at art. 10 § 4.
71. Id. at arts. 10, 11, 14.
72. Lei No. 9.960, de 28 de janeiro de 2000, D.O.U. de 29.1.2000 (Braz.); Lei No.
10.165, de 27 de dezembro de 2000, D.O.U. de 28.12.2000 (Braz.).
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Enclosure hereto to this Law."'73
Article 17-A provides for the collection of prices in consideration for
IBAMA's services and products listed in an enclosure to NEPA.74 The
law labels payments for several administrative licenses, licensing, registra-
tions, authorizations, inspections, etc., as pregos, (prices) when such pay-
ments are clearly police fees that commonly correspond to audit or
inspection actions such as the environmental licensing process, the condi-
tions of which, if disobeyed, shall bring about the respective liability for
unlawful conduct.75 The above statutory provision falls within the con-
cept of a fee (tribute) paid for compulsory public services.76 It should be
noted that the Tax Code follows the tax doctrine according to which the
wrong statutory designation of a tribute does not affect the respective
juridical nature that arises from its taxable event.77 This doctrine has
been supported by case law. 78
Clearly article 17-A has instituted police fees vis-A-vis the topical exer-
cise of police power provoked by the taxpayer in need of legally required
licenses, authorizations, inspections, registrations, etc., similar to fees
paid for the issuance of a patent or an annual automobile inspection.
Those fees may only be charged by the federal environmental authority
when lawfully exercising its administrative competence, which happens in
only two cases: (1) when states and municipalities have failed to perform
their environmental police duties and (2) when the taxpayer's activity
produces a regional or national impact-where the federal interest is at
stake, thus justifying a federal service and the collection of the respective
fee. States and municipalities may also collect similar fees for the respec-
tive environmental services.
Charging the above fees for licensing and registration does not prevent
governments from collecting other police fees for environmental moni-
toring or control, in light of the permanent services of inspection of po-
tentially polluting activities-licensed or not-either spontaneously, upon
notification (dwellers, NGOs, etc.), or pursuant to routine double-check-
ing of entrepreneurial information to the environmental authority. The
monitoring and inspection competence must be statutorily stated, the
same being required of the typification of the taxable event of the respec-
tive fee. In such cases, environmental authorities must have the potential
ability to intervene ex officio, which requires the actual existence of a
ready-to-act structure so as to enhance its deterrent or repressive capabil-
ities. In the absence of such a structure, police power cannot be exer-
73. Lei No. 9.960 at art. 17-A (translated by the author).
74. Previous attempts to establish a list of fees designated by prices by administrative
normative acts were voided by the Federal Supreme Court. ADI No. 1.823-DF,
22/98 Repert6rio lOb de Jurisprudencia 560 (Braz.).
75. Cf. EDIS MILARP, DIREITO DO AMBIENTE: DOUTRINA, PRATICA, JURIS-
PRUDI NCIA, GLOSSARIo 261 (Revista dos Tribunais ed., 2000).
76. C.T.N., at arts. 3, 77, 114.
77. Id.
78. Cf. Stmula No. 545 of the S.T.F. (Braz.), available at www.stf.gov.br.
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cised, and thus the taxable event of the respective fee shall be deemed as
to not occur.
B. THE FEE OF ARTICLE 17-B (ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND
INSPECTION FEE)
Article 17-B states, "It is hereby instituted the Control and Inspection
Environmental Fee - TCFA, the taxable event of which is the regular
exercise of the police power conferred upon IBAMA for controlling and
inspecting activities which use natural resources and are potentially
polluting.",79
Law number 10.165 of 2000 has tried to legitimize previous administra-
tive ordinances, decrees, and statutory provisions aiming at empowering
IBAMA to collect a general environmental control and inspection fee
due not only in the case of an effective or topical deployment of the envi-
ronmental police services (covered by article 17-A as discussed earlier)
but which would be also due in case of potential or deterrent use of police
power (article 17-B). In trying to typify the taxable event of the above
fee as "the regular exercise of police power entrusted to IBAMA for con-
trolling and inspecting potentially polluting activities and those which use
natural resources," article 17-B neither identifies which concrete actions
or measures can be taken by IBAMA nor names the circumstances under
which the respective administrative acts ought to be performed.80
Because the Constitution upholds the legality principle, it requires that
the actual institution of a tribute (fee) be done through a statute 8'
describing the taxable event (that is to say, which police act 82 is to be
performed by the administration under certain circumstances), 83 as re-
quired by legal doctrine,84 for "depending on the police act exercised
there shall be a specific fee." '85
The above doctrine is especially important when coupled with the fed-
erative principle that requires that competences held in common (which
is the case of environmental protection) must be exercised within the lim-
its reciprocally balanced by federal, state, and municipal interests. As
already noted, the Constitution requires that Congress sets down general
79. Lei No. 10.165 at art. 17-B (translated by the author).
80. Id. (translated by the author).
81. See C.F. at art. 150; C.T.N. at arts. 97 § III, 114.
82. RtGiS FERNANDES DE OLIVEIRA, TAXAS DE POUCIA 54 (Revista dos Tribunais
ed., 2d ed. 2004)("an expressive act of police power") (translated by the author).
83. Maria Ltcia Luz Leiria, Breves Consideragdes Sobre a Taxa de Controle e Fiscal-
izacao Ambiental - TCFA, Instituida Pela Lei n. 10.165/2000, in DIREITO
TRIBUTARIO AMBIENTAL 773, 777 (Heleno Torres ed., 2005) ("which police action
to be exercised") (translated by the author).
84. ALBERTO XAVIER, OS PRINCIPIOS DA LEGALIDADE E DA TIPICIDADE DA
TRIBUTACAO 59 (1978) (administrative legality and tax typification are not ful-
filled by reference to an abstract model).
85. BERNARDO RIBEIRO DE MORAES, DOUTRINA E PRATICA DAS TAXAS 130 (Revista
dos Tribunais ed., 1976).
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rules (supplemental law) 86 providing for cooperation among the political
entities and aiming at the attainment of balanced development and well-
being nationwide. 87 Also, the Constitution requires that a supplemental
law shall provide for the resolution of conflicts of taxing power among
the federal union, the states, the federal district, and the municipalities
and regulate the constitutional limits of the power to tax.88
In this context, NEPA-received by the 1988 Constitution as supple-
mental law89-established that the basic environmental police power is
entrusted to states. And the Tax Code90-also received by the Constitu-
tion as a supplemental law-requires that fee-taxed public services ought
to be related to the respective incumbencies of the union, states, and mu-
nicipalities, thus questioning the legitimacy of the IBAMA fee.
It seems that, due to procedural reasons in extraordinary appeals, the
Supreme Court 9a so far could not have examined issues such as the re-
quirement of supplemental law, double taxation, and the strange set-off
of local environmental fees against the federal IBAMA fee. A direct ac-
tion of unconstitutionality filed by the National Confederation of Indus-
try is yet to be tried.92
The IBAMA fee risks bypassing the division of administrative compe-
tences provided for by NEPA (sole paragraph of article 23 of the Consti-
tution). And public-service manipulation for the purpose of fee
collection has been criticized by legal doctrine. 93 So, if according to
NEPA the basic environmental police competences are entrusted to the
states, the IBAMA fee may be rendered unlawful, for the respective pub-
lic service is illegal in the first place and the corresponding fee may be
contaminated by the illegitimacy of its taxable event. 94
Theoretically speaking, to validate the IBAMA fee, its drafters should
have required the amendment of NEPA for changing the subsidiary na-
ture of IBAMA's police power, and this ought to be made by supplemen-
tal law, not by an ordinary federal statute that is of an inferior
hierarchy 95 for potential conflicts of administrative and taxing compe-
tences are at stake.96 Also, it must be noted that such supplemental law
86. C.F. at art. 69 (stating that supplemental laws must be approved by an absolute
majority vote in both houses of Congress).
87. Id. at art. 23 sole paragraph.
88. Id. at art. 146 §§ I-II.
89. Leonardo Greco, Competencias Constitucionais em Mat ria Ambiental, 687
REVISTA DOS TRIBUNAIS 23-33, 27 (1993).
90. Also received by the Constitution as a supplemental law.
91. Leading case: RE-Recurso Extraordinirio No. 416.601, Relator: Min. Carlos Vel-
loso, 10.08.2005 (Braz.), available at www.stf.gov.br
92. S.T.F. ADI No. 2.422 (Braz.), available at www.stf.gov.br.
93. Geraldo Ataliba, Taxa pelo Exercicio do Poder de Polfcia - Fato Gerador - Base de
C4lculo, 102 REVISTA DE DIRErTo ADMINISTRATIVO 474, 489 (1970).
94. Ruy BARBOSA NOGUEIRA, CURSO DE DIREITO TRIBUTARIO 164 (9th ed. 1989).
95. PAULO DE BARROS CARVALHO, CURSO DE DIREITo TRIBUTARIO 114-15 (Saraiva
ed., 1985).
96. SACHA CALMON NAVARRO COLHO, CURSO DE DIREITO TRIBUTARIO BRASI-
LEIRO 100 (7th ed. 2004).
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itself would have to defer to municipal competence wherever the local
interest is present.97
The double taxation or fee overlap is connected to the administrative
competence deviation and is finally uncovered by the unusual provision
for an IBAMA fee set-off against state and municipal fees.
98
Unconstitutional duplication of local competences may not be justified
by a federal need of cash. Nor can one reasonably understand the ra-
tional behind the fee set-off device: each level of government has its own
set of competences to which the respective services and fees must corre-
spond. Should a local government exercise its police power and collect
the relevant fee, then no federal service is to be rendered nor any federal
fee due, there having no room for a strange discount, which in turn
reveals an overestimation of the federal fee in the first place.
Also, the amount of the IBAMA fee does not pass the proportionality
test. It is to be charged according to the revenues of the taxpayer, which
has nothing to do with the cost of the environmental public service con-
cerned, for it should be based on the amount of public work.99
Sure fees may be secondarily calculated according to taxpayers' subjec-
tive circumstances, but in any event, this calculation must be accom-
plished with reference to the basic criterion above, that is to say, in
proportion to, and limited to, the influence of taxpayers' private activities
on the amount of public services, and specifically in terms of environmen-
tal taxation, the degree of internalization of environmental costs by the
taxpayer, which represents a change in the respective behavior, so as to
allow for less administrative controls. 10 0 The doctrine of tolerance fees
(Duldungsgebiihr) as applied to surveillance fees should come into play,
thus enhancing the search for the real reasonable equivalence required in
terms of accuracy of the taxable basis of environmental fees.
Even though Brazilian tax principles would not hamper a different ap-
proach, domestic doctrine and jurisprudence have been formalistic and
conservative when it comes to cost-benefit testing (such as that reported
by Herrera Molina as required by Spain's general law on fees and public
prices). 10 1 In fact, reasonableness is a tool for judicial control of propor-
tionality, and it ought to be routine in courts, especially in relation to
causal tributes, such as fees for public services. Otherwise, fiscal citizen-
ship cannot be exercised without being subjected to arrogant, absolute
presumptions, bordering on fiscal authoritarianism, which are inconsis-
tent with the principles of transparence, morality, and efficiency in mod-
ern states governed by the rule of law.' 02
And in this case, the gross revenues of the taxpayers' 0 3 do not seem to
97. NEPA at arts. 5, 6, 14; see EDIS MILAR8, supra note 75, at 263.
98. Lei No. 10.165 at art. 17-P, -Q.
99. Ataliba, supra note 93, at 488; MORAES, supra note 85, at 188.
100. See Molina & Vasco, supra note 47, at 93, 103.
101. MOLINA & TABOADA, supra note 25, at 105.
102. See C.F. at art. 37.
103. Lei No. 10.165 at art. 17-D § 1.
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fit as an indication of polluting potentiality of the taxpayers' en-
trepreneurial activities.
Besides, when the law applies the additional and coordinated criteria of
polluting potentiality and degree of natural-resource use of activities sub-
ject to environmental control, the respective list absolutely presumes de-
grees of potential pollution and degrees of use, not providing for
migration from a high, medium, or low level to another, according to the
foregoing perspectives, in as much as not paying attention to en-
trepreneurial specificities and anti-polluting investments.
A better solution would have been to leave to environmental authori-
ties to classify businesses according to legal standards leading to low, me-
dium, or high risk indications on a case-by-case basis, as it is done in
France 10 4 and also in Brazil (as in the case of mandatory public insurance
against labor accidents, as accepted by the Supreme Court,10 5 subject to
judicial control, technical evidence, and court debate).
The law under analysis therefore should not pass the test of constitu-
tionality as to the principles of equality, reasonableness, and proportion-
ality under due process material standards. 106
Moreover, potential-pollution absolute presumptions 10 7 may not be re-
versed by material evidence as to new levels of polluting risks due to
environmental investments, so as to enhance a change in the risk-classifi-
cation list, thereby reducing the amount of the IBAMA fee due by indi-
vidual taxpayers. The stratification of the list impedes judicial control
over administrative decisions that ought to be taken in classifying busi-
nesses according to general statutory criteria, attracting criticism on
grounds of a breach of the principle of separation of powers. 108
Besides, the foregoing statutory approach to environmental taxation
generates a perverse effect detrimental to sustainable development ef-
forts in accordance with the principle of preservation, for environmental
taxation ought to stimulate environment-friendly investments, because no
specific advantage or fiscal incentive is granted in consideration thereof.
A final concern involves the risk of bureaucratic inertia being fed by
new fiscal vegetative revenue (similar to a passive cadastre fee) with no
engagement as to environmental behavior change. Having thereby se-
cured funding, environmental authorities might feel indirectly stimulated
to take pro-active measures, not actually performing the taxable event of
the fee in question (which is the effective exercise of police power).
104. PRIEUR, supra note 3, at 45.
105. RE-Recurso Extraordimirio No. 343.446 (Braz.), available at www.stf.gov.br.
106. C.F. at arts. 5, 150.
107. See PtREZ DE AYALA, Jose Luis & CONDE DE CEDILLO, LAS FICCIONES EN EL
DERECHO TRIBUTARIO 113-14 (Derecho Financiero ed., 1970).
108. Rafael Bielsa supports judicial control on matters of abusive, unequal, and dispro-
portional taxes, for taxation is not a political issue, nor a subject of political discre-
tion. See 2 RAFAEL BIELSA, ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO P13BLICO 41-42 (1951).
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VIII. STATE AND MUNICIPAL ENVIRONMENTAL FEES
Following article 17-B's IBAMA fee pattern, several states and munici-
palities have enacted laws instituting quite similar environmental fees, the
taxable event of which is either "the exercise of police power conferred
upon environmental agencies for controlling and inspecting businesses
classified as potentially polluting and users of natural resources"'10 9 or
"the exercise of police power pursuant to environmental licensing."
1 10
A different pattern, more consistent with the doctrine supported by the
author, has been followed by Maca6 City (State of Rio de Janeiro), home
to Brazil's largest offshore oil fields and huge supporting industrial and
service businesses."' According to Local Law number 28, of December
28, 2001, which instituted a fee for inspection of environmental licensing,
the taxable event of this fee is "the regular and effective administrative-
police inspection, exercised over productive, commercial and service ac-
tivities, and over the use of environmental resources aiming at condition-
ing and restricting the use and fruition of said goods."' 112 The fee is
assessed by taking into consideration the nature of the activity concerned,
the size of the respective premises, and the cost of the regular and effec-
tive deployment of administrative police.
11 3
Minas Gerais state 1 4 and Rio de Janeiro state"15 have enacted laws
instituting forestall fees, which have followed the pattern of article 17-A's
IBAMA fee intended to finance certain environmental police topical in-
terventions authorizing designated activities such as the extraction or de-
velopment of natural resources. These statutes have the merits of
properly naming the exactions thereby created, calling them fees rather
than public prices, which is the misleading wording used by federal law.
IX. SNUC ENVIRONMENTAL COMPENSATION
Law number 9.985, of July 18, 2000 (SNUC), instituted a mandatory
financial support in favor of implementation and maintenance of "full-
protection environmental conservation units," which must be established
by the government.1 1 6
According to article 36 of the law, the foregoing financial support is
due upon licensing of businesses causing significant environmental impact
109. Lei No. 14.940, de 29 de dezembro de 2003, D.O.E., Minas Gerais de 30.12.2003
(Braz.) (translated by the author); Lei No. 14.384, de 31 de dezembro de 2002,
D.O.E. GoiAs de 31.12.2002 (Braz.) (translated by the author).
110. Lei No. 5.441, de 14 de dezembro de 2001, D.O.E. Vit6ria 29.12.2001 (Braz.)
(translated by the author).
111. Katherine Baldwin, World's Largest Rig Sinks: Massive Oil Spill Feared, TRIBUNE,
Mar. 21, 2001, http://www.tribuneindia.com/2001/20010321/world.htm#6.
112. Lei Complementar No. 28 art. 332, de 28 de dezembro de 2001 (translated by the
author), available at http://www.macae.rj.gov.br/legislacao/.
113. Id. at art. 335.
114. Lei No. 4.747, de 9 de maio de 1968, D.O.E. Minas Gerais de 10.5.1968 (Braz.).
115. Lei No. 3.187, 12 de fevereiro de 1999, D.O.E. Rio de Janeiro de 13.2.1999 (Braz.).
116. Lei No. 9.985, de 18 de julho de 2000, D.O. de 19.7.2000 (Braz.) (translated by the
author) [hereinafter SNUC].
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as deemed by the competent environmental authority; the respective sec-
tion 1 provides that the amount of the financial support is to be estab-
lished by the licensing agency and must not be inferior to 0.5 percent of
the total cost of the project concerned."17
Decree number 4.340, of August 23, 2002, has clarified that the licens-
ing agency ought to establish the degree of the environmental impact
(following an environmental impact study) taking into consideration
"negative and immitigable impacts" on environmental resources.118
Ongoing unlicensed projects were ordered to apply for the respective
environmental licenses within twelve months as of the above decree en-
actment date, thereby being subject to the new financial support under
the terms of a "rectifying or corrective operating license." 11 9
The foregoing financial support has been referred to as SNUC compen-
sation because it substitutes for the previous material duties of imple-
menting an ecological station 120 or conservation reserve' 21 to be fulfilled
by entrepreneurs in instances where big businesses destroy forests or
other ecosystems. Said duties (to be valued in proportion to the environ-
mental damages caused) had been tentatively established by administra-
tive normative acts and not by statute. 122 Such material duties ought to
be classified as tributes in kind or in natura equivalent to a facere,
whereas as SNUC compensation would correspond to a dare (a tribute in
specie) in lieu of the former.1 23
SNUC compensation seems to be similar to the German compensatory
taxes reported by Wilfred Kluth (statutes of Renania-North-Westfalia
and of Baden Wuirtemberg) whereby the agent causing environmental
degradation in a given site ought to perform compensatory measures
elsewhere, such as the planting of trees. Should this prove impossible or
insufficient, then the polluter must pay the corresponding environmental
117. Id. at art. 36 § 1.
118. Decreto No. 4.340 art. 31, de 22 de agosto de 2002, D.O.U. de 23.8.2002 (Braz.)
(translated by the author).
119. Id. at art. 34 (translated by the author).
120. Resoluq~o CONAMA No. 10, DE 3 DE DEZEMBRO DE 1987, D.O.U. DE 18.3.1988
(BRAZ.). CONAMA is the National Council for the Environment, the federal
normative authority for environmental matters.
121. Resoluq o CONAMA No. 2, DE 18 DE ABRIL DE 1996, D.O.U. DE 25.04.1996
(BRAZ.).
122. Those administrative acts, however, are allegedly based in article 4, section 1 of
NEPA. NEPA at art. 4 § 1.
123. For taxes in kind, see THOMAS MCINrYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
TAXATION 587 (2d ed. 1886); ANrTONIO BERLIRI & FERNANDO VICENTE ARCHE
DOMINGO, 1 PRINCIPIOS DE DERECHO TRIBUTARIO 26-27 (Derecho Financiero
ed., 1964); GIULIANI FONROUGE ET AL., DERECHO FINANCIERO 317-18 (7th
ed.2001); ALBERTO XAVIER, MANUAL DE DIREITO FISCAL 38-39 (1974); PEDRO
SOARES MARTINEZ, DIREITO FISCAL 45 (1998); BALEEIRo,supra note 54; GIL-
BERTO DE ULHOA CANTO, Obrigafdo Tributdria, Seus Pressupostos e Elementos, in
CURSO DE DIREITO FINANCEIRO 104 (1958); ALFREDO AUGUSTO BECKER, TE-
ORIA GERAL DO DIREITO TRIBUTARIO 562-80, 577 (2d. ed. 1972).
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tax (compensatory tributes) in consideration for the above damages.12 4
Such similarity reinforces the author's understanding that the Brazilian
SNUC compensation ought to be treated as a true tribute.
A. TAXABLE EVENT
SNUC compensation falls within the statutory concept of a tribute as
per the Brazilian National Tax Code. 125 "A tribute is any mandatory pe-
cuniary payment, except penalties for illicit acts, to be made in money or
that can be valued in monetary terms, instituted by law and levied
through administrative ministerial acts. '126
In fact, the entrepreneur's duty to pay the financial support (pecuniary
obligation) does not arise from the practice of any illicit act, his conduct
falls within the environmental tolerance zone.127 Pecuniary SNUC com-
pensation substitutes for previous tributes in kind such as the establish-
ment of environmental reserves following serious environmental
degradation. And the situation that presently triggers taxation is neither
the destruction of forests nor other ecosystems, but the development of
projects that cause significant environmental impact.
B. THE CONCEPT OF SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT AND
TAX LEGALITY
Brazilian environmental statutes do not provide for a definition of the
concept of significant environmental impact. The Federal Constitution
calls for mandatory environmental impact studies in cases of significant
degradation of the environment. 128 The NEPA, however, does not deter-
mine the legal concept at stake; 129 nor does the SNUC 30 or its regula-
tion13 ; neither does the Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente
(CONAMA) resolution on environmental impact reports, which simply
repeats NEPA's wording on environmental degradation and pollution.132
NEPA defines degradation of environmental quality as "the adverse al-
teration of the characteristics of the environment;" pollution is defined as
"the degradation of environmental quality resulting from activities that
124. Wilfried Kluth, Protecci6n del Medio Ambiente Mediante Tributos Ecol6gicos en la
Reptiblica Federal Alemana, in FISCALIDAD AMBIENTAL 194 (Ana Ydbar Sterling
ed., 1998).
125. The Tax Code is deemed by doctrine and case law as a supplemental law, approved
by a 51 percent majority vote in both houses of Congress, which may not be con-
travened by ordinary statutes (leis ordindrias), such as the SNUC.
126. C.T.N. at art. 3 (translated by the author).
127. The SNUC does not quote article 225 section 3 as being thereby regulated; section
3 is the constitutional basis for environmental sanctions and damage collection.
128. C.F. at art. 225 1 § IV.
129. NEPA at art. 10 § 4.
130. SNUC at art. 36.
131. Decreto No. 4.340 at art. 31.
132. Resoluqdo CONAMA No. 1 art. 1, de 23 de janeiro de 1986, D.O.U. 17.2.1986
(Braz.).
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damage the health. '1 3 3
Brazilian laws actually leave up to environmental authorities' discre-
tion the concretization of the foregoing relevant and complex undeter-
mined legal concepts, leaving little scope for judicial control of
proportionality. Such way of describing or typifying the taxable event of
SNUC compensation is subject to criticism on grounds of breach of tax
legality. Former administrative CONAMA rules (though not statutes)
objectively defined relevant environmental impact as the destruction
(elimination) of forests and other ecosystems caused by engineering
works, for the purposes of ordering the pollutant to establish an ecologi-
cal station or an environmental reserve in consideration and in propor-
tion thereof.134 Now the SNUC leaves it open to environmental
authorities to charge SNUC compensations in case of significant environ-
mental impact, which is a rather volatile idea.
C. TAXABLE BASIS
Here again the law seems to be deficient. SNUC compensation is to be
assessed not in proportion to the environmental damage generated by the
entrepreneurial project, but in accordance with the degree of environ-
mental impact deemed to be significant by environmental authorities.
The taxable basis of SNUC compensation is the total cost of the en-
trepreneurial project subject to a minimum tax rate of 0.5 percent.135
Again, one finds here an inadequacy of the statutory language as to tax
legality as interpreted by doctrine and by the Federal Supreme Court, 136
which requires that the basic tax guidelines are provided for by Congress
even in the case of the use of undetermined legal concepts, which does
not seem to be the case of SNUC compensation, the constitutionality and
proportionality of which is virtually impossible under the circumstances.
On the other hand, the law establishes the taxable basis as the total cost
of the entrepreneurial project and not the economic dimension of the
respective environmental impact, which would be a reasonable and con-
trollable criterion.
Besides, the total cost of a project comprehends the value of accessory
costs such as studies and interest, mitigation measures, etc., that ought to
be deducted from that amount precisely either because they have nothing
to do with the production of environmental impacts or because they are
intended to fight pollution. So, there is a logical gap between a SNUC
compensation taxable event (extraordinary environmental degradation)
and the respective taxable basis as recommended by environmental taxa-
133. NEPA at art. 3 §§ 11-II ("a) damage the health, safety and welfare of the popula-
tion; b) create adverse conditions to social and economic activities; c) have an
unfavorable effect on biota; d) affect the aesthetic or sanitary conditions of the
environment; e) discharge materials or energy that do not conform to established
environmental standards") (translated by the author).
134. Resoluqfo CONAMA No. 10; Resoluqao CONAMA No. 2.
135. SNUC at art. 36 § 1.
136. See RE No. 343.446.
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tion doctrine. 13
7
D. THE FEDERATIVE ISSUE
In Brazil, residual taxing powers pertain to the union.138 Because there
is no constitutional provision as to strict-sense environmental taxation,
the establishment of a SNUC-like compensatory tax shall be deemed as
attributed to the federal competence, to be exercised through the enact-
ment of a supplemental law, as required by the Constitution, which is not
the case of the SNUC. This circumstance attracts legal criticism on
grounds of formal unconstitutionality of the law.
On the material side of the issue, such compensation being a federal
tax, the SNUC could not have delegated authority for state and municipal
environmental licensing agencies to levy the tax. Federative cooperation
and solidarity have nothing to do with delegation of the power to tax, that
ought to be granted by the Constitution directly to the competent politi-
cal entity. Because most of environmental licensing in Brazil is con-
ducted by states and the law also provides for state and city
environmental conservation units, federal law could not have created a
non-federal tax in favor of those local political entities. The union may
not create local taxes, nor may federal tax revenue be attributed to local
entities, except where provided to the contrary by the Constitution
itself.139
Finally, in order to ordain the exercise of potentially conflicting admin-
istrative (and connected taxing) competences, the Constitution requires
the enactment of a supplemental law (not an ordinary law) that has not
been produced so far. Thus, it seems that also from the federative
viewpoint, SNUC compensatory tax does not pass the test of
constitutionality. 140
137. Jean-Phillippe Barde, Environmental Taxation: Experience in OECD Countries, in
ECOTAXATION 235 (Timothy O'Riordan ed., 1997); Amy J. Holzinger, Eco-Taxes
in the European Union: The Need for a Uniform Structure, 21 WIs. INT'L L.J. 185,
198 (2003); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Constitutionality of State Environmental
Taxes, 58 TUL. L. REV. 169 (1983); SUSANA BOKOBO MOICHE, Gravimenes e In-
centivos Fiscales Ambientales 93, 95-96 (2000); MOLINA & TABOADA, supra note
25, at 166. Brazilian economic literature also proclaims that the amount of envi-
ronmental losses are to be calculated by estimating costs connected to avoiding
such losses. SEROA DA MorA & FRICKMAN YOUNG, Sistemas Integrados - 3.3
Procedimentos de Valora do, in CONTABILIDADE AMBIENTAL: TEORIA, METODO-
LOGIA E ESTUDOS DE CASOS NO BRASIL 35 (1995).
138. C.F. at art. 154 § I.
139. Id. at arts. 153 4 § III, 157 § I.
140. The Federal Supreme Court is presently trying a direct unconstitutionality action
challenging the SNUC compensatory tax; the Reporter Justice's opinion (made
known on June 14, 2006) is in favor of the constitutionality of the tax, but the trial
was suspended for better consideration of other justices. ADI No. 3.378, available
at www.stf.gov.br
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X. FINAL REMARKS
Environmental taxation is based on the polluter-pays principle, which
is a fundamental principle of environmental law. Besides, taxing pol-
luters would not violate a basic principle of tax law, which is the taxable
ability principle.
Environmental imposts ought to be levied on wealth according to the
taxpayers' economic strength, and polluters have a marginal gain when
they pollute and do not internalize the costs of pollution, as if using the
environment for profit were a cost-free business. In this sense, they may
be a valuable instrument for purposes of environmental protection.
Regarding environmental fees, they are also based on the polluter-pays
principle, so that polluters must fund environmental public services re-
quired by public interest in controlling polluting activities. Therefore,
such fees ought to reflect a fair distribution of the public-service costs in
connection to taxpayers' subjective circumstances interfering with those
costs; such assessment should consider taxpayers' environmental invest-
ments that reduce or minimize the amount of administrative work of en-
vironmental authorities.
A. IBAMA's ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL FEE AS A PATTERN
FOR TAXATION
Brazilian environmental fees take IBAMA's environmental control fee
(IBAMA fee) as a pattern for such state and municipal taxation. Such
fee seems inconsistent with some basic principles of taxation in general
(the competent taxable event, tax equality, and tax legality) as well as
with the polluter-pays principle that inspires environmental taxation.
The basic environmental control competence in Brazil is attributed to
the states; but the law grants IBAMA, the federal Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, the power to levy a fee to be set off against local environ-
mental fees, as if IBAMA fee would originally prevail over state and city
environmental fees.
For argument's sake, the SNUC should at least be interpreted as al-
lowing for exaction of IBAMA fee only in cases where IBAMA is to act
under its lawful authority (i) to license and subsequently audit projects or
businesses that cause a regional (inter-state) or national environmental
impact, or (ii) to substitute for states and municipalities that have failed
to fulfill their respective police-power environmental incumbencies.
The statutory design of the IBAMA fee is such that the taxpayer is not
stimulated to invest in pollution control, for the fee basis does not allow
for mobility among the respective, absolutely presumed, polluting-status
brackets. 141
The IBAMA fee has been challenged in courts and is yet to be fully
tested (trial of direct unconstitutionality action being awaited) by the
141. The taxpayer is, however, subject to command-control measures.
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Federal Supreme Court, which has upheld the fee in the strict procedural
limits of extraordinary appeals. There is no doubt that environmental
fees are a relevant tool for environmental policy and control and that the
respective revenues are needed for funding of efficient environmental
services. Expectations are that Brazilian environmental fees can be tech-
nically and fairly improved so as to properly finance public services with
an eye at valuing entrepreneurial efforts towards curbing pollution. Envi-
ronmental power to tax should lead to better taxation in such a way that a
fair balance may be achieved among different federative financial needs;
the exercise of the power to tax must not end up frustrating creative ini-
tiatives of entrepreneurial actors in response to their social and corporate
responsibilities, that is, in favor of sustainable development through envi-
ronment-friendly investments, which in turn would reduce the respective
tax burden.
B. ENTREPRENEURIAL COMPENSATION
SNUC compensation is a compensatory tribute; its juristic nature is
that of a strict sense environmental tax (impost), the first such tax ever
instituted in Brazil, for it is levied in the presence of an extraordinary
environmental damage (phrased by law as a significant environmental im-
pact). Notwithstanding, the entrepreneur has the duty to reclaim the
damaged environment as much as possible and to undertake all appropri-
ate mitigation measures as foreseen in the required environmental impact
study. The compensation should then be levied on the basis of the
residual environmental loss or degradation. A correct legal approach of
the law would be to assess the tax in proportion to the value of the dam-
ages cause by the entrepreneur-taxpayer, rather than to take into account
the total cost of the project, in as much as investments in mitigation and
in pollution control have not been provided for as reducing the taxable
basis.
The SNUC does not seem to meet legality-principle requirements, for
it fails to provide for tax-assessment objective criteria; not only is its defi-
nition of the taxable event (any significant environmental impact) un-
clear, but also it delegates to environmental licensing authorities the
legislative duty to establish the amount and the limit of the tribute, for it
simply refers to a minimum 0.5 percent of the total cost of the polluting
project.
Because the taxable event of SNUC compensation is the actual verifi-
cation of an environmental damage, the SNUC does not violate the gen-
eral principle of non-retroactivity of statutes, such law being applicable as
of its coming into force. There is no guarantee against retroactivity in
environmental law. 142 But the executive order that regulates the SNUC
only indirectly provides for retroactivity in cases of non-licensed opera-
142. PRIEUR, supra note 3, at 129-30; ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 177 (2d ed. 1988)
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tions that ought to be licensed.143
Even though Congress has paid more attention to broad-meaning envi-
ronmental tax proposals, the author believes that fair strict-sense envi-
ronmental taxes ought to be established in Brazil so as to enhance sound
public policies aimed at environmental protection. One reason for this
optimistic expectation is found in the new wording of the Federal Consti-
tution, which provides for environmental protection as a principle of Bra-
zil's economic order, "including a differentiated treatment according to
the environmental impact of products and services and the respective
elaboration and rendering" processes. 144
143. SNUC at art. 34.
144. C.F. at art. 170 § IV (translated by the author).
